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ABSTRACT 
 
The UML (Unified Modeling Language) has its origin in mainstream software engineering 
and is often used informally by software designers. One of the limitations of UML is the lack of 
precision in its semantics, which makes its application to safety critical systems unsuitable. A 
safety critical system is one in which any loss or misinterpretation of data could lead to injury, loss 
of human lives and/or property. Safety Critical systems are usually specified by very precisely and 
frequently required formal verification.  With the continuous use of UML in the software industry, 
there is a need to augment the informality of software models produced to remove ambiguity and 
inconsistency in models for verification and validation. To overcome this well-known limitation 
of UML, formal specification techniques (FSTs), which are mathematically tractable, are often 
used to represent these models. 
Formal methods are mathematical techniques that allow software developers to produce 
softwares that address issues of ambiguity and error in complex and safety critical systems.  By 
building a mathematically rigorous model of a complex system, it is possible to verify the system's 
properties in a more thorough fashion than empirical testing.  
In this research, the author refines transformation rules for aspects of an informally defined 
design in UML to one that is verifiable, i.e. a formal specification notation.  The specification 
language that is used is the Z Notation. The rules are applied to UML class diagram operation 
signatures iteratively, to derive Z schema representation of the operation signatures.  Z 
representation may then be analyzed to detect flaws and determine where there is need to be more 
xi 
 
precise in defining the operation signatures.  This work is an extension of previous research that 
lack sufficient detail for it to be taken to the next phase, towards the implementation of a tool for 
semi-automated transformation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Definition 
The motivation for doing this work stems from research that have been conducted 
previously at the University of North Dakota on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Clachar et. al. 
conducted research on Formalizing UML software models of safety critical systems [1].  The 
researchers used formal specification to enhance the imprecision semantics of UML and analyze 
its significance to safety critical systems.  As a result, a systematic process to transform ambiguous 
UML class diagrams to a formal representation for verification and validation was devised.  In a 
follow up study conducted by Jackson et. al. the researchers conducted a case study on validation 
and verification of object-oriented design using formal specification technique [2].  In that study a 
preliminary set of rules were defined for transforming UML class diagrams methods to formal 
specification (Z notation) [2].  The transformational rules they developed were not complete and 
were at a very high level of abstraction.  In order for these transformation rules to be productive, 
they necessitates further elaboration and refinement.  Hence, this research attempts to produce a 
complete set of transformation rule for converting UML class operation signature to Z 
notation/description. 
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1.2 Benefits of the Research 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) have been in existence for many years.  UASs 
commonly referred to as Unmanned Aerial Systems is defined as a system, whose components 
include the air vehicles and corresponding hardware that do not involve a human operator, but 
instead maneuver autonomously or are remotely piloted. UAS must be considered in a system 
context, which encompasses the command, control and communications systems, and personnel 
necessary to control the unmanned aircraft [3] [61].  However, recently, the use of UASs has 
experienced immense growth and UASs play a central role in scientific research, defense, and in 
certain industries [3] [4]. In recent past, the use of UASs technologies lie at the core of military 
operations such as spacecrafts, aircrafts, helicopters, free-flying robots or mobile robots,  
surveillance, target identification and designation, mine detection, and reconnaissance [3] [4]. As 
their use continues to evolve, research has peaked on this technology to discover its applicability 
to other domains. UAS technologies are categorized as safety critical systems. This is due to them 
being utilized in high-risk tasks that require thorough development methodologies to guarantee 
their integrity.   Today, UASs are involved in high-risk tasks such as border and port surveillance 
by the Department of Homeland Security, assist with scientific research and environmental 
monitoring by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA [54]. A system that is defined as safety critical can have 
serious ramifications if an error occurs. These implications include the risk of injury, loss of life, 
data, and property. Therefore, designing these systems requires: 1) thorough understanding of their 
requirements, 2) precise and unambiguous specifications, and 3) metrics to verify and validate the 
quality of software produced. 
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In order for safety critical aviation systems to be accepted by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and other interested parties, they must adhere to standards such as the 
RTCA DO-178B and its current descendant D0-178C [5]. The DO-178B is an airworthiness 
compliance standard, which governs the development and certification of aerospace systems. It is 
a process-oriented evaluation of sound software engineering practices in system design [6]. The 
standard focuses on all aspects of round trip engineering and requirements based testing as key 
elements of software verification to uncover errors [6].  DO-178C is the latest revision to the DO-
178B guidelines, which addressed objectives for software development life cycle processes, 
activities and design considerations for achieving the objects and verifying the objectives [50].  
DO-178C also addresses object-oriented development concepts and specific techniques. 
The University of North Dakota (UND) – UAS Risk Mitigation Project1 was awarded a 
contract to develop a proof-of-concept air truth system, which monitors the operation of UAVs in 
the US National Airspace (NAS). The project began with minimal requirements; however, the 
timeframe for delivery was very rigid. This resulted in the rapid development of a prototype to 
assist in exploring and developing additional requirements. One feature of prototypes is that they 
are often poorly documented. To resolve this, concurrent definition and documentation of system 
requirements were performed as the prototype evolved. This was enhanced with the design of 
graphical software models. In model-driven engineering, the purposes and uses of graphical 
software models are multifaceted. They represent the structural design of the system, and the flow 
of data and communication between the various systems and subsystems. Its use is not only suited 
for astute stakeholders but also non-technical stakeholders such as customers – to convey how 
their requirements are being met. The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is an ISO standard for 
                                                          
1 http://www.uasresearch.com/home.aspx 
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designing and conceptualizing graphical models of software systems [7]. Since its development 
by the Object Management Group (OMG)2 in the early 1990’s its use has increased in industry 
and academia. Graphical software models, such as UML models, possess simplistic designs and 
promote good software engineering practices. However, these models are not without limitation. 
Graphical software models are often imprecise and ambiguous. In addition, they are not directly 
analyzable by type checkers and proof tools. This makes it difficult to evaluate the integrity and 
correctness of its models; therefore, valid assertions cannot be made with regard to meeting user 
requirements. 
 Formal Specification Techniques have been advocated as a supplementary approach to 
amend the informality of graphical software models [8] [9]. They promote the design of 
mathematically tractable systems through critical thinking and scientific reasoning. FSTs use a 
specification language, for instance Z notation, to describe the components of a system and their 
constraints [10]. Unlike graphical models, formal models can be analyzed directly by a proof tool 
– which checks for errors and inconsistencies. Critics of FSTs claim, they increase the cost of 
development, require highly trained experts, and are not used in real systems [11]. Yet, they have 
been used in case studies which unveiled that, FSTs facilitate a greater understanding of the 
requirements and their feasibility [1] [2] [12]. Although the use of FSTs is sometimes 
controversial, their benefits to critical systems offset the disadvantages.  
This work documents the transformation rules for UML class operation signature to an 
analyzable representation using formal specification techniques. Equally, the specific 
advancement that this work encourages is to provide a mean by which these transformation rules 
can be automated. Automation is necessary because of the volume involve in such work – manual 
                                                          
2 www.omg.org 
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interventions can be monotonous and inaccurate. Such process will reduce the introduction of 
human errors when applying transformation rules. 
1.3 Research Contribution 
 Previous research has demonstrated that the application of formal specifications to safety 
critical systems is important for the purpose of precision.  The present work is designed to define 
a set of rules for transposing UML operations to Z schema, which is an extension of work done by 
France et. al. [8] [12] [16] [24]. This research introduces four steps that are applicable to any 
domain that is categorized as safety-critical and where formalism is necessary. The present 
analysis demonstrates that it is feasible to apply formal specifications to safety-critical systems, 
although the manual process is tedious and the use of notations are necessary. The present research 
is therefore intended to make contributions to the literatures on formal specifications, and UML 
models.  In addition, this work may lead to the production of a similar tool highlighted in work 
done by Gogolla et. al. for UML and OCL validation [62].  
1.4 Research Approach 
UML is now an ISO standard [7] and has its advantages in simplicity, intuitiveness and 
recently has been considered for specification purposes. However, UML falls short in the latter 
area because it utilizes some loose semantics, which leads to ambiguity among its models. In some 
cases, ambiguity can be negligible, however in safety critical systems this may lead to detrimental 
consequences. One technique to eliminate this ambiguity is by transforming UML models to an 
analyzable representation with the use of formal specification techniques. Prior work has been 
conducted in formalizing UML class diagram operation signatures at an abstract level [2]; from 
that research, it requires that in order for those transformation rules to be effective, it demands 
elaboration and refinement. This effort will look at how UML class diagram operation signatures 
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can be formalized by applying rules to user-defined functions using a formal specification 
language, Z notation. 
According to [1], formal specification techniques (FST) incorporate the use of a 
specification language to describe software models with precision. As noted previously, the 
specification language utilized for our research is Z. FST also permits the use of proofing tools 
which identify errors in specifications executed within the proofing tool environment. The 
employment of FST will look at checking and analyzing the Z schemas that have been yielded 
from the system’s UML class diagram. A proof tool used to accomplish this which, has shown to 
be effective in detecting syntax and semantic errors of the Z representation of our UML model is 
Z/EVES. Carrying out a series of analysis of error checking using this proofing tool is a key 
element in the validating system models. 
In an effort to automate model transformation in the future as a byproduct of this research, 
a set of model transformation rules will be highlighted throughout the methodology. Model 
transformation works by accepting one or more models, by applying rules called transformation 
rules, a target model is then attained which is equivalent to the input model [1]. Transformation is 
currently being conducted manually however, with the establishment of detailed transformation 
rules the process can be done automatically. As a byproduct of this research, automatic UML 
model transformation into their equivalent Z schemas will be a focus in future works. To aid in 
this potential research, the methodology aims to highlight a set of transformation rules, which will 
be used to accomplish automatic model transformation. 
EBNF (Extended Backus Normal Form or Backus–Naur Form) is a recursive notation 
technique for describing the productions of a context-free grammar. It is developed based on the 
work of John Backus with contributions by Peter Naur [17] [18]. It is often used to describe the 
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syntax of languages used in computing, including computer programming languages, because of 
its simple notations, recursive structures, and it is widely supported by many compiler generations 
tools such as YAAC [19], LEX [20], and ANTLR[21]. BNF is applied wherever exact descriptions 
of languages are needed for instance, in official language specifications, in manuals, and in 
textbooks on programming language theory. It is realized in applications that the descriptive power 
of BNF may be greatly improved by introducing a few extended meta-symbols, particularly those 
for repetitive and optional structures of grammar rules.  
Extended Backus Naur Form (EBNF) will be used to describe UML operation signature. 
After which, the researcher will go through a process of systematically deriving an algorithm 
definition for each transformation rule – the refinement process.  Having refined the rules, testing 
of each algorithmic description will be done on a case study.  From the case study, conclusion will 
be drawn of the result as it relates towards determining the success of the effort. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
The effort of this work is limited to defining a set of algorithms for transforming UML 
operation signature that are presented in a complete UML class diagram.  This research draws on 
work done by [1] [2] and will not attempt to redefine any rules define by [1], but merely drawing 
on the stated output of the researcher work [1].  In addition, building of an application will not be 
an attempt in this study but defining a set of algorithms that could be implemented in such an 
application.  
Limitations encountered relate to timing constraints and available work effort. The process 
of deriving formal rules is very lengthy hence, the manual efforts involved in developing them 
spanned several semesters. The breakdown is as follow: 
Semester 1 – Literature review as an independent topic 
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Semester 2 – Deriving rules 
Semester 3 – Case study 
Semester 4 – Case study 
Semester 5 – Case study 
Transformation rules and case study were done in two semesters iteratively and another semester 
was spent writing the thesis. 
1.5.1 Expected Outcome 
The output of this reports include:  1) a set of rules and algorithms for transforming UML 
operations to Z schema. 2) Results from the case study and a conclusion of the success of the work 
and its future implementation.  The algorithms will constitute the high-level pseudo-code 
description that would lead to implement a system that will conduct the transformation in a semi-
automatic manner.  The transformation cannot be fully automated as some operations constraints 
can only be specified in English prose.  
1.6 Description of Thesis / Report Organization 
Chapter 2 incorporates areas that were reviewed for doing this work as well as prior 
research in this sub-discipline. Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the methodologies 
performed in this research. Chapter 4 is a case study on the UAS and results of the transformation 
rules to the system. The report is concluded in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 2.1 Model Driven Approach  
The focus of Model Driven Engineering (MDE) is to transform, refine, and integrate 
models into the software development life cycle to support system design, evolution, and 
maintenance [22]. Models serve many purposes and their use varies from investors to investors. 
The purpose of modeling, from a developer’s standpoint, is to represent the proposed system by 
showing: 1) the flow of data between objects and individual components of the system as well as 
how they can interact with other software components, 2) Communication between internal entities 
and external components, and 3) how the system behaves to stimuli.  
Models should be logical, cohesive, and provide an abstract way to visualize the design of 
a system and show how the proposed system will address the users’ requirements. One way in 
which models can be derived is by forward engineering activities. Forward engineering is the 
process of moving from high-level abstractions and implementation of independent designs to the 
implementation of a system [23].  
Software models facilitate:  
 Abstraction - This feature allows models to be independent of any programming language, 
style, or algorithm design.  
 Improved understanding of the project’s goals and user’s requirements - Members of the 
development team(s) can distinctly see how the proposed solution addresses the customer’s 
needs, and the impact that their aspect of work has on meeting these requirements.  
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 Enhanced communication between the various stakeholders. The intent of some models is 
to be conveyed to all stakeholders. The outcome is to encourage all stakeholders to play an 
active role in the design of the system and to explore the feasibility of its requirements.  
Various software development life cycle models are suitable for specific project related conditions, 
which include organization, requirements stability, risks, budget, and duration of project. One life 
cycle model theoretical may suite particular conditions and at the same time another model may 
also looks fitting into the requirements but one should consider trade-offs while deciding which 
model to choose. 
While Software models have many benefits, their disadvantages include the following:  
 On occasion, models are not updated which results in them becoming inconsistent with the 
source code. This affects the maintainability of the software as the models are not a true 
representation of their implementation.  
 Graphical models are abstract hence the software developer is not required to explore 
certain aspects of the system; for instance side effects related to variable declarations or 
premature initializations.  
 Failure to detect syntax, semantic and domain errors because these models cannot be 
directly verified for inconsistencies without the use of an external tool.  
Even though the use of software models can be unfavorable, it is still an essential step in the 
design, documentation, and maintenance of software systems. The result of modeling determines 
whether the models are indicative of the proposed system and if the user’s needs are adequately 
addressed.  There are many types of models and an excess amount of software tools used to aid in 
their design. This research uses the UML to support the design of graphical models. UML is 
appropriate because:  
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 It is an ISO Standard for designing models of software systems,  
 It is widely used in industry and academia, and  
 It is user friendly and understandable for all stakeholders.  
2.2 The Unified Modeling Language 
UML (Unified Modeling Language) is the de-facto standard formalism for object-oriented 
software analysis and design.  One of the most consequential components of UML are class 
diagrams, which model the information on the domain of interest in terms of objects organized in 
classes and relationships [40] [41].  UML class diagrams allow for modeling, in a declarative way, 
the static structure of an application domain, in terms of concepts and relations between them. 
A class in a UML class diagram represents an object or a set of objects with common 
features. A class is graphically rendered as a rectangle divided into three parts (see Figure. 1). The 
first part contains the name of the class, which has to be unique in the entire diagram. The second 
part contains the attributes of the class, each denoted by a name, possibly followed by the 
multiplicity and with an associated type for the attribute values [42]. The third part contains the 
operations of the class, that is, the operations associated to the objects of the class. The argument 
list is a list of parameter types (e.g., int, double, string, etc.) that is associated with operation. 
Operations that does not return a value should give a return type of void. 
The UML is an object-oriented modeling language for specifying, visualizing, 
constructing, and documenting the artifacts of software systems [7]. The UML is used to depict a 
high-level representation of the proposed system. This is achieved through the design of various 
types of models, which capture the structure and behavior of the system.  UML promotes some of 
the best software development practices; and this very quality is among the primary reasons for its 
acceptance. It serves as a blueprint for software engineers through the design of models and 
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diagrams, which are representative of various aspects of the proposed system. The benefits of 
UMLs are very present in the early phase of the software development life cycle where it is used 
to reproduce a high-level representation of the proposed system.  This abstract representation is 
achieved through the design of various types of models, which capture the structure and behavior 
of the system, sub-systems, and their internal and external components.   
UML models facilitate better communication among customers and developers.  Customer 
and developer get an opportunity to understand the project and its requirements before 
implementation commences. It also assists software developers to identify whether user 
requirements will be adequately addressed by the system. UML is widely accepted because of its 
simplicity, which makes it easily understood by developers thereby making it easily communicated 
to their customers [26]. 
Diagrams in UML are categorized as structure or behavior diagrams. Structure diagrams 
represent the static framework of the system [27], whereas behavior diagrams illustrate the 
dynamic features of the system.  Examples of structure diagrams include class, component, object, 
deployment, and package diagrams. Behavior diagrams depict the dynamic features of the system 
by showing how the system act during execution. These diagrams include use case, activity, and 
state diagrams.  Interaction diagrams are an extension of behavior diagrams but focus mainly on 
the internal elements of the system. Examples of interaction diagrams include sequence and 
collaboration diagrams. Class diagrams and use case diagrams facilitate prioritization and 
communication between nontechnical stakeholders and developers. Sequence and state chart 
diagrams that are more complex UML models, and are suited for intellectual advance stakeholders 
such as engineers and developers. 
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The scope of this paper will be on the static UML models – more specifically, the class 
diagram. Creation of a new class diagram in UML begins with a class. In UML notation, a class is 
represented as a rectangular box with three vertical compartments: the class header, list of 
attributes, and list of operations. Attributes are characteristics of a class that makes it unique; 
whereas operations, also called methods, performs tasks that could potentially change the state of 
the class. The focus of this work is on the class operations.  
Figure 1 below illustrates an example of two classes that have some mutual relationship 
depicted by the line connecting them.  Each has its own unique attributes (for example, Class A 
has Attribute_A0 through to Attribute_An) and some operations listed below the attribute list.  
Note that operation signatures may contain a list of parameters as well.  For the scope of this paper, 
focus will be placed on the operation signatures of classes. Previous research work done by Clachar 
et al. [1] focused on defining classes and attributes; and the need for greater attention on operation 
signatures should be done in order to have a complete transformation model to Z.  
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a UML class diagram 
Like other software development aids, as recorded before UML has its limitations. These 
informal models have an advantage, such as expressiveness – which makes the objective of the 
system easily conveyed to both technical and nontechnical stakeholders.  However, UML lacks 
precise formal semantics, which results in its models being subject to multiple interpretations.  This 
issue is worsened by the use of natural language annotations – as a means of clarification and 
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explanation of the modeling techniques adopted.  Due to UML's inherent flexibility, developers 
are given much scope when designing models. This freedom enables the developer to describe 
system requirements based on the modeling technique they have adopted.  However, problems 
arise when these models are circulated among the development team and each developer interprets 
the models in a different way – which could affect the latter stages of the software development 
life cycle (SDLC) [28].  Notations are often used to alleviate this issue; however, comments can 
be misinterpreted because it is expressed in natural language [16]. Furthermore, natural language 
notations cannot be processed by tools – therefore they also need to be formalized for analysis 
purposes [29].  Other problems arise as customer requirements unfold.  These critical changes are 
often not reflected in the models – albeit the source-code reflects the change; at that stage updating 
the models is often considered tedious and time-consuming. This result in difficulty of software 
maintenance as the UML models are often inconsistent with the source code and its significance 
is lost [30]. 
In some systems, the disadvantages of UML and the challenge of deriving precise models 
may not have a significant impact on the quality of software produced.  Yet, in safety critical 
systems, any inadequacy could result in the loss of property or be life threatening. The high cost 
during the implementation and early test phases are often times caused by errors at the specification 
and design phases [25].  Since UML is widely accepted, there is a need for methods to test the 
correctness of its models. This can be achieved with the use of formal specification techniques. 
2.3 Formal Specification Techniques 
 Formal specification has been in existence decades afore the inception of graphical 
techniques such as UML. FSTs utilize mathematical models and principles to describe software 
models with accuracy through rigorous analysis [3].  The specification language chosen in this 
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work is referred to as Z notation for the following reasons.   (1) It is an ISO standard, (2) There is 
an excess of research on Z notation and extensive implement support (3) It is based on set theory and 
predicate logic, which allows mathematical reasoning by categorizing real world entities into sets (4) 
Similarity with constructs used in UML – thereby making the transformation process easier to grasp.  
Developed at Oxford University, Z is a typed language based on set theory and first order 
predicate logic.  As well as a basic mathematical notation, Z includes a schema notation to aid the 
structuring of specifications [13]. In order to develop schemas, Z language uses typed 
mathematical facts including sets, relations, and functions in conjunction with first order predicate 
logic. Schemas define its relevant variables and specify the relationship between the values of the 
variables. A schema describes the stored data that a system accesses (variables) and alters [14]. A 
basic type is like a typical data type such as integer, natural number etc. however; it is user-defined 
and problem specific. A schema may include one or several basic types.  
 
 
Figure 2. Structure of a Z Schema 
 
  
Figure 3. A Basic Type Representation in Z 
There are two [2] representation of schemas: state schemas and operation schemas. State 
schemas are employed to define the static attributes of a system while operation schemas capture 
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dynamic aspects [16]. For the purpose of this research focus is placed on defining rules for user-
defined functions by formalizing UML class diagram, the operation schema is the schema of focus 
to demonstrate our methodology.  
A specification written in Z notation models the proposed system by specifying the 
components of the system and expressing constraints between those components [10].  Because of 
its formal basis it enables mathematical reasoning, and hence proves that, desired properties are 
outcomes of the specification [10].  From these proofs, one can verbalize that the system is 
behaving in a desirable or undesirable manner, provided the specification is precise and complete.   
System behavior should always be deterministic (deterministic in the sense that all events has a 
specified system response) in the domain of safety critical systems. These software systems 
encompass numerous highly intricate processing components and have high demands for 
reliability and accuracy.  Due to the perpetual utilization of UML in software development, there 
is a need to resolve the informal semantics of the models it produces [1].  To transform UML 
models into Z notation also provide formal analysis to accomplish verification and validation of 
software systems. 
Unlike UML, the formal models produced by Z can be analyzed directly by a proof tool – 
which checks for inaccuracy and inconsistencies.  Possible errors that are detected include syntax and 
type errors, and domain checks – such as division by zero [31]. Inconsistencies that are detected pertain 
to the meanings of predefined and user-defined expressions and the appropriateness of their use in a 
specification.  FSTs are not utilized to replace graphical software models; rather they are 
complementary. While formal models uncover inconsistencies and exclusion of requirements, the 
informal model is an explainable version of the formal models [24]. 
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2.4 Model Transformation 
 
Model transformation and refinement is a process that lies at the heart of model driven 
engineering (MDE), where platform independent models (PIM) are translated into platform 
specific models (PSM) utilizing formal rules – additionally referred to as transformation rules [32] 
[33]. The focus of MDE is to create and exploit domain models (that is, transform, refine, and 
integrate models), which are conceptual models into the software development life cycle to fortify 
system design, evolution and maintenance [22] [32].  The benefits of MDE was recognized and 
embraced by many organizations, including the Object Management Group (OMG) [22] – an 
association that creates and manages industry standards such as the UML.  There are many 
categories of model transformations that exist such as text-to-model transformation, model-to-
code transformation, and model-to-model transformation [22]. Although this work fixates on the 
latter, it will however also highlight the process of deriving the platform independent models. The 
platform independent models will be the UML class diagrams and the platform specific models 
will be their representative Z schemata.  
After the models are transformed, theoretical properties of the transformation such as 
termination, soundness, completeness and correctness can be proven [22]. Irrespective of the 
transformation approach taken, it is vital that software engineers have a good understanding of the 
scope of the project, as well as the abstract syntax and semantics of the source and target models 
[32].  Models can be transformed manually or automatically. A manual transformation applies 
custom transformation rules to specific problems. This type of transformation was employed in 
this work. Whereas automatic transformations apply predefined transformation rules that are based 
on a problem domain. These rules can also be regarded as a meta-model.  
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This research seeks to derive a set of manual transformation rules for a real world 
unmanned aerial system that are applicable to all problem domains. The outcome of this activity 
is to determine if there are standard processes for yielding formal models from informal UML 
models for the problem domain. Manually transforming these models is tedious and as such, it is 
prone to human errors. Consequently, if standard processes were established, it would prove 
advantageous to automate them in future work. Conducting a manual transformation will highlight 
patterns that suit automation and aspects that require indispensable human intervention. 
2.5 Extended Backus Naur Form 
The extended Bankus-Naur form is the most rigorous way to define syntax of programming 
languages. EBNF is a notation for formally describing syntax. That is, how to write entries in a 
language [37] [38].  The use of EBNF will be used throughout this study to describe syntax 
formally.  However, there is a more compelling reason to begin the use of EBNF: it is a microcosm 
of programming itself.  In [39] Yong Xia and Martin Glinz have proposed a mapping from 
graphical language to EBNF aiming at the elimination of inconsistencies and ambiguities in UML 
diagrams. Complicated EBNF descriptions are easier to read and understand if their rules are well 
named, each name helps to communicate the meaning of its definition. However, to a compiler, 
names cannot change the meaning of a rule or the classification of a symbol [37]. 
Although, not incorporated in this work, but for future work EBNF can be used to describe 
C syntax formally. First, the control forms in EBNF rules are strongly similar to the basic control 
structures in C: sequence; decision, repetition, and recursion; also similar is the ability to name 
descriptions and reuse these names to build structures that are more complex. There is also a strong 
similarity between the process of writing descriptions in EBNF and writing programs in C: we 
must synthesize a candidate solution and then analyze it - to determine whether it is correct and 
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easy to understand.  In this study, EBNF will be used to define syntax as a textual meta-model for 
the operation signature.  
2.6 Related Tools – Z/EVES 
There are many communities that are involve in developing a set of tools for editing, type 
checking, animating, and proving formal specification written in the Z specification language. 
However, many of them are command line tools and accept specifications in the Z Latex style 
[34]. Other implementations such as Z/EVES, CZT: Community Z Tools Project and RoZ have 
graphical interfaces that enable users to create Z specifications in a more user-friendly 
environment, while ensuring strict correspondence between the UML model and the Z schemata 
[35]. For the purpose of this study Z/EVES will be used to demonstrate the application of the 
define methodology. 
Z/EVES offers some powerful automatic commands for general simple theorems proving 
for Z notation (e.g., prove or reduce) [51] [52]; it also has the ability to demonstrate the consistency 
of specification or refinements. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a detailed description of the methodologies performed in our 
research. The methodology involves three processes: 1) Using the operation signature description 
in EBNF. The rationale for using EBNF is that it provides a meta-model that it is easier to convert 
from textual (UML) to another textual format (EBNF). 2) Defining operation transformation rules, 
and 3) Converting transformation rules to algorithms.  
This research is based on efforts of previous work [1] [2]. These work, focused on 
formalizing UML software models of safety critical systems, and validating and verifying 
functional design for complex safety critical systems.  In addition, rules for transforming UML 
graphical models to Z notation were defined.  This research completes the transformation rule by 
defining a set of rules that must be followed for defining operations in a class. Figure 4 shows an 
example of a class diagram base on the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) [1]. 
What follows in this research is a description of a series of sequential steps that will be carried out 
in transforming UML operations to Z representation.  As each step is defined, it will be 
demonstrated by applying the rules to the operations shown in Figure 4.   The operations that the 
rules will be applied to are:  
 convert_to_internal_speed (speed: Double): Double 
 convert_to_external_speed (speed: Double): Double 
 convert_heading (heading: Double): Double 
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Figure 4. Example of a UAS Class Diagram 
 
3.2 Extended Backus–Naur Form (BNF) Parsing rules for operations signature 
transformation 
 
Extended Backus Normal Form (EBNF), a syntactic meta-language, is a notation technique 
for expressing context-free grammars in computer science. It is often used where clear formal 
description and definition is required to describe the syntax of languages used in computing, 
including computer programming languages [55].  EBNF is applied wherever exact descriptions 
of languages are needed, for instance, in official language specifications, in manuals, and in 
textbooks on programming language theory [37] [38].  In this work, EBNF will be used to define 
a set of formats for operation signatures.   Any develop automated tool will have to implement the 
EBNF operation signature format so that operation can be parsed to production rule. 
While the UML model represents operation signature as textual, our work would be more 
understandable if a textual meta-model representation is utilize.  The scope of this meta-model is 
a class diagram.  The textual description that is appropriate for this work is EBNF.  Adhering to 
the ISO/IEC 14977: 1996 international standard, Figure 5 illustrates a meta-model class diagram 
description for a class operation signature. 
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Figure 5. Meta-model description of a Class Diagram 
For the purpose of this study, constraints that govern operations names are:  
1. Size of operation name will follow the C standard 5.4.2.1 translation limits. 63 significant 
initial characters in an internal identifier or a macro name (each universal character name 
or extended source character is considered a single character and 31 significant initial 
characters in an external identifier [56]. 
2. Words that conflict with key word in UML and Z should not be used. 
The following EBNF grammar rules shown in Table 1 are adhered to when converting UML 
operations to EBNF: 
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Table 1. Rules for Converting UML Operations to EBNF. 
<operation_signature> :: = <return_type><operation_name>“(“<parameters>”)” <constraint> 
<return_type> :: = <z_type> |<user_defined_type> 
<z_type> :: = ℤ|ℕ 
<user_defined_type> :: = void | char | string | short | long | float | double | signed | unsigned | char_string 
<char_string> :: = <letter><more_letter> 
<letter> :: = <upper_letter>|<lower_letter> 
<upper_letter> :: = A | B | C | D | E | F| G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z 
<lower_letter> :: = a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h | I | j | k | i | m | n| o | p| q | r | s | t | u | v | w | x | y| z 
<more_letter> :: =<letter><more_letter> | _<more_letter> | <digit><more_letter> | <digit> | <letter> 
<digit> :: = 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 
<operation_name> :: = <char_string> 
<parameters> :: = <parameter_pair> “,”<parameters> | <parameter_pair> 
<parameter_pair> :: = <return_type>< char_string> 
<constraint> :: = < pre_condition><post_condition> | <pre_condition> | <post_condition>  
<pre_condition> :: = PRE<const_string> 
<post_condition> :: = POST<const_string> 
<const_string> :: = <char_string> | <special_char><const_string> | <special_char> 
<special_char> :: = ∀ | ∃ | ∧ | ∨ | ¬ | ⊢ | ∃1 |  ∅ | ∈ | ∉ | ∪ | ∩ | ⇒ | ⇔ | ≠ | ⇸ | ⤔ |⤀ | ⤗ | → |↣ |↠ |⤖ |⇻ |⤕ | 
λ | μ  
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EBNF is a grammar used for checking the parsing of operation signature description from UML 
diagrams.  EBNF may be used in deriving parse trees for an automated translator.  A developer 
may have written constraints in first order predicate logics. Here the special_char would allow for 
the parsing of such constructs; with the assumption that the developer has properly defined the 
format statement. 
3.3 Operation Transformation Rules 
In the following subsections transformation for each parts of an operation will be described.  
The development of the operation signature will be governed by these rules. 
3.3.1 Defining Operation Basic Types Schemata 
Declare all the necessary data types before schema definitions. Data types in Z are often 
referred to as basic types or given sets of the specifications. A feature of the Z notation is that it 
offers a calculus for building large specifications from smaller components [9] – and basic types 
facilitate this. The importance of basic types and given sets is that they allow one to categorize real 
world entities into sets. These sets are an essential part of Z schemas because they are used to 
represent objects and their respective attributes. In this work, basic types will be represented in 
capitalized letters so that they can be easily identified.  The software engineer must examine the 
attributes of each UML class to identify types that do not have an equivalent representation in Z. 
Presently, the Z Mathematical Toolkit only directly supports integers [44]. Therefore, other data 
types needs to be defined.  For any string that is not of the type INTEGER (ℤ), a basic type will 
be created for it in the Z specification. The process of declaring basic types is not entirely 
automatable, because some data types will require manual intervention to ensure that they are 
representative of the parameters. However, the process of extracting the name of the data type and 
declaring them in the Z specification can be automated.  If parameter does not have an associated 
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data type, and such misrepresentations arise sporadically in UML models, the name of the 
parameter will be declared and used as a Z basic type [12].  Examples of declaring an operation 
basic type schemata based on the class diagram and operations {(convert_heading(heading: 
double): double, convert_to_internal_speed(speed: double):double and 
convert_to_external_speed(speed:double): double} found in Figure 4 is: [DOUBLE]. 
3.3.2 Define Parameter List Schemata 
This step encompasses the description of the Z schema that will contain parameter of each 
operation.  Each UML operation may contain zero or more parameters. Hence, one of two possible 
options must be taken: 
Option 1: UML operation with no parameter 
In this option, the definition of a parameter schema is nonessential and any attempt to define a 
representative Z schema would be illogical and result in rejection by Z/EVES.  For example, the 
update_display operation in the Radar Display class diagram, Figure 4, contains no parameter. 
Therefore, no parameter schema definition is necessary. 
Option 2: UML operation with one or more parameters 
The parameter of each operation will be declared in a parameter type schema.  This step is 
performed successively on each parameter of the UML operation, in two stages, to determine: 1) 
the name of the parameter and the data type associated with the parameter; and 2) any constraints 
(values) associated with the parameters.  Initially, a one-to-one mapping must be established 
between parameter /(s) and one of the previously defined basic types or a data type that exist in 
the Z mathematical toolkit.  For the latter phase, parameters along with their respective values will 
be determined.  Constraints that are either domain-specific or operational will be depicted in the 
schema predicate section.  The naming convention used for parameter list schemata is the name of 
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the parameter followed by the keyword ‘parameter’.  For differentiation purpose, each parameter 
will have an associated index/counter since the same parameter may appear in multiple operations. 
With reference to Figure 4, the following constraints in Table 3 govern the parameters of each 
operation.  For future work, a format for expressing constraints can be developed, for instance 
ATT_NAME : <value_range>.  An example is given for the convert_heading operation in the 
Aircraft class diagram of Figure 4, which contains one parameter.  Their equivalent parameter type 
schema is: 
 heading_parameter_01  
heading: ℙDOUBLE   
 
∀ h : heading ⦁ 0 ≤ h ≤ 180 
 0 
 
3.3.3 Defining Parameter Configuration Schemata 
Operations in a class may contain parameters as an item of their execution. This step will be 
conducted only if an operation accepts parameters. The configuration schema includes all 
previously defined parameter types.  When creating these configuration schemata, each item in the 
parameter list of an operation is included as the definition of the parameter type.   Where each 
parameter will be identified by its name and corresponding basic type, thus mapping each 
parameter name to a Z data type or a basic type.  These steps should be repeated for each operation 
that utilizes parameters in their operation implementation.  The naming convention used for 
parameter configuration schemata is the name of the operation followed by the keyword 
‘parameter’.  Operations are governed by pre-conditions, post-conditions or a combination of both.  
Where there is no way to automate the pre-condition or post-condition, comments will be utilized.  
An Example of defining parameter configuration schemata based on the convert_heading 
operation found in Figure 4 Aircraft class is:  
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 Convert_heading_Parameter_01  
heading_parameter_01 
 
The Aircraft class operations {(convert_to_internal_speed (Speed: double) double) and 
Radar_Display class (move (x: integer, y: integer))} have three associated parameters of types 
double, and integer.  Integers are present in the Z mathematical toolkit and should not be declared 
as a basic type.  However, the data type called Double are native to some modeling environments 
but not all; neither is it specified in the Z mathematical toolkit. The basic type parse should 
therefore identify it as a new basic type. In today’s common computer processors, a data type of 
Double precision is essentially a real number with a 64-bit constraint on its size. Manual 
intervention could change the data types, which were declared as double to a basic type called, 
real. Take into consideration that simply changing the name of the basic type from double to real 
is semantically equivalent to any proof tool. Therefore, changes of this nature to a basic type will 
require that constraints be enforced on the data type. Otherwise, the manual intervention would be 
unproductive. 
In the Z specification of the Aircraft Class Diagram, it was important to state what 
constitutes a double. Since real numbers were not originally defined in the Z mathematical toolkit 
and many existing implementations for real numbers are incorrect [45], there was a need for an 
appropriate representation for these attributes. Previous work by [45] contains specifications for 
representing floating point values in Z. However, such effort is outside the scope of this work. In 
addition, the implementation is very rigid and will not evolve if the size of floating point values 
increase in future processors. 
There are many arguments surrounding the implementation of real numbers and other 
floating point values. However, a key feature, which separates integers from floats, is that floating 
point values account for both a numeric precision and a scale whereas integers are whole numbers; 
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i.e. floating points are approximated values whereas integers are their exact values. The analytical 
nature of formal methods does not require such distinction to make valid assertions about the 
system. Therefore, substituting real numbers for integers will suffice. 
The result of the basic type parse will return the following: [INTERGER] and [DOUBLE]; 
manual intervention can substitute DOUBLE with integers – where necessary. 
This schema definition incorporates the parameter type schemata for all parameters that exist in 
an operation.  
3.3.4 Define Operation Schemata 
After defining parameter configuration schemata, operation schemata is declared. It is 
mandatory for all methods to have a name. A method that does not have a name will result in 
compilation error.  Making use of schema inclusion, an operation schema is defined by 
incorporating the associated parameter schema.  Additionally, any other variables local to an 
operation are declared and where necessary constraints on variables or parameter values are 
defined in the predicate part of the schemata.  Operations with the same name may appear in 
different classes; therefore, a counter/index is utilized to identify each operation.  The naming 
convention used for operation schemata is the name of the operation followed by the keyword 
‘operation’.  Key notational conventions are used in the operation schema definition, which 
indicates if the execution of a specific operation changes the state of the system.  Δ Aircraft means 
that there is a change in the state of the schema after the execution of an operation. See Table 4 
that provides a list of notation and their definition that will be utilize in an operation schema.  An 
Example of defining operation schema based on the convert_heading operation found in Figure 4 
Aircraft class is: 
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 Convert_heading_Operation_01  
Δ Aircraft 
Convert_heading_Parameter_01 
heading ′:ℙ DOUBLE 
 
heading ′ = heading 
 
3.3.5 Defining Configuration Schema 
 
This schema will incorporate operations to previously define class schemas that were defined 
by Clachar et. al.  Updated class schema will include operation schema.  
3.4 Transformation Rule Algorithms 
 
Below are algorithms for each transformation rule that were define in section 3.3.1 to 3.3.4 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the steps corresponding to defining operation basic type schemata in Z.  
Each operation must be associated with a basic type in Z, if the basic type is not found in Z then 
one is define and is refer to as a user define type.  Operations that have no associated type are 
assigned a basic type, that is, the operation name.  All basic types are represented in block letter.  
This process is repeated until all basic types are defined. 
begin 
for all class in the class diagram 
  for all operation in the class 
    for each type 
     if type! =ℤ 
       if type! =blank 
        basic_type is USER_DEFINE_TYPE 
       else 
        basic_type is OPERATION 
       endif 
     endif 
       create basic type schema   
 endfor 
  endfor; 
endfor;  
endbegin 
 
Figure 6. Algorithm for Defining Operation Basic Type Schemata 
30 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the process for defining one or more parameter found within an operation.  
A counter value is ascribe to a parameter name as an index.  This index value diffrentiates each  
parameter in an operation, since more than one operation within a class may have the same 
parameter name.  Any constraints relating to a paramter are also define in the schema. 
 
begin 
int count= 0; 
 
for all class in the class diagram 
  for all operation in the class 
   for each parameter in the operation 
     create schema name "parameter name_PARAMETER_[count++]" 
     create parameter schema  
     if constraints presents 
      add constraints 
     endif 
   endfor 
  endfor; 
endfor;  
endbegin 
Figure 7. Algorithm for Defining Parameter Schemata 
begin 
int count = 0; 
 
  for all class in the class diagram 
    for each operation in the class 
        if parameter exist { 
             create configuration schema name "operation name_PARAMETER_ [count++]" 
           schema include all operations parameter schema } 
        endif    
    endfor; 
endfor; 
endbegin 
 
 
           
 Figure 8. Algorithm for Defining Parameter Configuration Schemata 
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To define a parameter configuration schemata, the folowing steps outlined in Figure 8 must 
be adhered to.  The schemata incorporates all previously defined parameter schemata that is 
associtaed with the operation.  An index is also attached to each schema name.  
 
Figure 9 depicts the process for defining operation schemata.  An operation schema is 
defined by incorporating the parameter configuration schemata with an index value join to the 
name of the schema.  Any constraint that is placed on the operation is added also. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
begin 
int count= 0; 
 
for all class in the class diagram 
  for each operation in the class 
     create operation schema name "operation name_operation_[count++]" 
  if paramater exist 
     schema include parameter configuration schema 
  endif 
  if constrainrs exist 
     add operation constraints 
   endif 
 
  endfor; 
endfor;  
endbegin 
   
   
   
   
 
Figure 9. Algorithm for Defining Operation Schemata 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY 
4.1 Description of the Aircraft System 
The growing social and economic interest in new unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) 
applications demands that UASs operate beyond the segregated airspace they are currently able to 
fly. Unmanned aircraft are not currently permitted access to national air space (NAS) in the United 
States without special permission from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). However, 
UAS operations in non-segregated airspace should be regulated by aeronautical authorities before 
UASs can share air space with manned aerial vehicles (MAV).  Despite the existence of 
technologies that could facilitate the integration and operation of UASs in non-segregated airspace, 
several obstacles remain, mainly UAS safety conditions and airworthiness independent of 
application. For example, one of the primary concerns with integrating unmanned aircraft is their 
inability to robustly sense and avoid other aircraft [47].  Another current barrier to the integration 
of UASs is related to the cultural perception of its risks [48].  According to National Transport 
Safety Board (NTSB), injury and damage by NTSB classification for U.S. Air carriers operating 
under 14 CFR 121 for the year 2012 is 16 and 11 respectively, see Table 2 [46].  Table 2 outline 
accidents with four types of classifications (that is, major, serious, injury and damage) that 
occurred during 2008 to 2012 irrespective of compliance to aircraft regulations.   This shows that 
while there are regulations that govern air carriers, some form of formalism is required to prevent 
accidents or catastrophic events.  In order for UASs to fly safely into civil airspace, the 
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development of vigorous testing of UASs, both in laboratory and field experimentation, are key 
prerequisites.  
The United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) is actively involved in unmanned aircraft 
research across numerous departments involving many projects, aircraft, government agencies, 
and experimental programs. The importance of these research projects to the Academy, the faculty, 
the cadets, the Air Force, and to the defense of the nation cannot be understated. In an effort to be 
proactive in cooperating with recent concerns from the FAA about the growth and proliferation of 
UAS flights, the Air Force has implemented several new guidelines and requirements. Complying 
with these guidelines, directives, and regulations has been challenging to researchers and the 
conduct of research activities at USAFA. Finding ways to incorporate these new guidelines 
effectively and efficiently is critical to research and participation in joint projects and exercises 
[49]. 
To ensure the reliability of these systems, both MAVs and UASs must operate within the 
same domain that is, US NAS.  However, a system must be in place that deals with any form of 
collision [53].  This aim led to the development of a UAS Research, Development and Design 
Project at UND3.  The project goal is to ascertain how practical it is for UASs to operate in an 
unrestricted airspace, in low-density populated area. 
The UND –UAS Research, Development, and Design Project architecture is composed of 
three main components: a radar system, a data computation unit, and a displays system. The display 
and data computation system operations is the focus of the work presented here in. 
 
 
                                                          
3 http://www.uasreasearch.com/aboutus/projects.aspx 
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Table 2. Accident by NTSB Classification, 2008 through 2012 for U.S. Air Carriers Operating 
Under CFR 121 
 
Accidents    
Year Major Serious Injury Damage 
2008 4 1 8 15 
2009 2 3 15 10 
2010 1 0 14 14 
2011 0 0 19 12 
2012 0 0 16 11 
 
Definition of NTSB Classifications: 
 Major - an accident in which any of the three conditions are met: 
A part 121 aircraft was destroyed or there were multiple fatalities or there was one fatality 
and a part 121 aircraft was substantially damaged. 
 Serious - an accident in which at least one of the two conditions are met: 
There was one fatality without substantial damage to a part 121 aircraft or there was at least 
one serious injury and a part 121 aircraft was substantially damaged. 
 Injury - a nonfatal accident with at least one serious injury and without substantial damage 
to a part 121 aircraft 
 Damage - an accident in which no person was killed or seriously injured, but in which any 
aircraft was substantially damaged 
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4.2 Application of Methodology 
In this section, the transformations rules that were developed in Chapter III will be applied 
to a subset of the UAS system.  The rules will apply to all operations of Figure 10, for the complete 
transformation of the case study please see Appendix A: 
 
Figure 10.UAS Aircraft and Radar Class Diagram 
The above diagram, Figure 10 is a small subset of classes from the system model currently 
being formalized.  This will be used to demonstrate the execution of the transformation rule on the 
class operations.  These transformation rules include: 
1) Step 1: Defining basic types 
2) Step 2: Defining Parameter Schemata 
3) Step 3: Defining Parameter Configuration Schemata 
4) Step 4: Defining Operation Schemata 
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4.2.1 Constraints on Class Diagrams 
 
Table 3 represents constraints that govern each class diagram in Figure 10.  As a final step 
in the transformation rule, constraints are manually included in the schema of the operation. 
 
Table 3. Constraints for Aircraft, Radar_Display and Aircraft_Coordinates Class Operation 
Attributes 
 
Constraints on Aircraft Class Attributes 
The following constraints govern the Aircraft class:- 
Speed: All speed have a lower and upper bound.  The speed of the aircraft should not 
exceed the speed of supersonic. The minimum and maximum speed for the 
Aircraft are: - min_speed = 0.0 and max_speed = 250 knots  
Heading: The minimum heading = 0.0; maximum = 360.0 
 
Constraints on Radar_Display Class Attributes: 
passive_mouse: The boundary for the mouse drawing on the x axis is:  0.00 to 180.00 degrees 
The boundary for the mouse drawing on the y axis = 0.00 to 180.00 degrees 
set_center: The center can begin from anywhere between -90.0 to 90.0 in latitude (across) 
and -180.0 to 180 longitude (down). 
set_scale: 1 inches = 100 foot 
 
Constraints on Aircraft_Coordinates Class Attributes: 
Latitude : Minimum latitude = -90.0; maximum latitude = 90.0 
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Longitude: minimum longitude = -180.0; maximum longitude = 180.0 
Altitude: minimum altitude = -3000.0; maximum altitude = 168960.0 
 
An important feature of formal specification is that of “state”. A system can be in one of 
several different states. Z captures a system change of state base on the data that a system store 
and how data are change in the schemas. Some of the notations used in this research are listed 
below with their corresponding uses. 
Table 4. Notations Used to Specify Change in the State of Operation Schemas and their 
description 
Notation Symbol Example Description 
Delta Δ Δ Aircraft Shows that there is a change in the state of the schema 
after the execution of an operation 
Xi Ξ Ξ Radar_Display Demonstrates that there is NO change in the state of 
the schema after the execution of an operation 
Prime variables ′ X′ Conventionally used to represent the value of a 
variable after an operation  
Unprimed 
variables 
 X Value of a variable before execution of an operation 
For all ∀ ∀ x : xed ⦁ 0 ≥ x ≤ 10 Forall x:X | P1 ⦁ P2 means: any element of X that 
satisfies P1 also satisfies P2 
 
Table 5 illustrates a subset of the operation signature schemas that were developed from 
conducting the formalization techniques outlined in chapter III, on the class diagram of Figure 10.  
Appendix A has the completed schema for Figure 10. 
 In the example that follows three (3) basic types were defined, specifically, [DOUBLE], 
[GPARS_AIRCRAFT_ DATA], and [BOOLEAN], five (5) parameter schemata, three (3) 
configuration parameter schemata and  four (4) operation schemata.  The parameter schemas are 
convert_heading_Paramaters, convert_to_internal_speed_Paramaters and 
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passive_mouse_Parameters.  The operation schemas are convert_heading, 
convert_to_internal_speed, update_display, and passive_mouse. 
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Table 5. Z Schemas for the UML Class Diagram of Figure 10 
 
Operation Name: Convert_heading(heading: Double): Double 
 
 
 
Step 1: [ DOUBLE] 
 
 
 
Step 2:   heading_parameter_01  
heading: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ h : heading ⦁ 0 ≤ h ≤ 180 
 
 
 
Step 3:   Convert_heading_Parameter_01  
heading_parameter_01 
 
 
 
Step 4:   Convert_heading_Operation_01  
Ξ Radar_Display 
Ξ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Δ Aircraft 
Convert_heading_Parameter_01 
heading ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
heading′ = heading 
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Table 5. cont. 
Operation Name: Convert_to_internal_speed(Speed: Double): Double 
 
Step 1: [ DOUBLE] 
 
 
 
Step 2:    speed_paramater_02  
Speed: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ s: speed ⦁ 0.0 ≤ s ≤ 250 knots 
 
 
Step 3:   Convert_to_internal_speed_Paramater_02 
speed_parameter_02 
 
 
 
Step 4:   Convert_to_internal_speed_Operation_02  
Ξ Radar_Display 
Ξ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Δ Aircraft 
Convert_to_internal_Speed_Parameter_02 
speed′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
speed ′ = speed 
 
  
 
Operation Name: Update_display () 
 
 
 
Step 1: [ UPDATE_DISPLAY] 
 
 
 
Step 2 and 3 are ignored because there is no parameter for update_display operation 
 
 
 
Step 4:   Update_display_03  
Ξ Aircraft 
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Table 5. cont. 
 
Operation Name: passive_mouse(Aircraft_data:GPARS_Aircraft_DATA, x: Integer, y: Integer): Boolean 
 
Step 1: [GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA] 
             [BOOLEAN] 
 
 
Step 2:   Aircraft_data_parameter_03  
Aircraft_data: GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA 
 
 
 
 x_parameter_04  
x: ℙℤ 
 
∀ X: x ⦁ 0.00 ≤ X ≤ 180.00  
 
 y_paramater_05  
y: ℙℤ 
 
∀ Y: y ⦁ 0.00  ≤ Y ≤ 180.00  
 
 
Step 3:   passive_mouse_Paramater_03  
air_craft_parameter_03 
x_paramterer_04 
y_parameter_05 
 
 
Step 4:   passive_mouse_Operation_04  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
passive_mouse_Parameter_03 
Aircraft_data′: GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA 
x′: ℙℤ 
y′: ℙℤ 
 
Aircraft_data′ = Aircraft_data 
x′ = x 
y′ = y 
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A basic type and parameter type schema will not be defined for the update_display 
operation.  The reason seeing that, this operation signature carries no data type and no parameter. 
According to the define parameter list schemata rule, this step will be conducted only if an 
operation accepts parameters.   
4.3 Results and Analysis 
In the methodology above, formal methods were applied on operations to demonstrate the 
application of the refinement and transformation process.  The component of subset class diagram 
obtained from the UAS Risk Mitigation system contained 3 classes, and 31 operations (27 user 
defined basic type, 44 parameter schemata, 29 configuration parameter schemata, and 31 operation 
schemata.  Operations also consist of constraints for some parameters in operations. The 
application of the process defined in the methodology provides a realistic way of applying formal 
methods rather than theoretical considerations.  Still, the work that was involved in carrying out 
this project was very tedious which introduced periodic errors.  Thus, implementing a tool to 
automate the formalization process would be beneficial.  This would simplify the conversion 
(Schema definitions), reduce the workload, and lessen the probability of human errors in the 
specification.    
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This research defines and illustrates the steps involved in deriving operation schema for 
UML class diagrams of a safety critical system.  In many software applications such as in the safety 
critical areas it is important to have correct and bug free software.  Formal specification is one such 
approach to produce good quality, correct and error free software.  The purpose of using notation 
like Z is to produce an accurate specification from initial client requirements. The notation has a 
restricted syntax so it is precise but still abstract enough so as not to constrain how a developer will 
go on to design application.  This study supports the need for reliable development methodologies 
for safety critical systems and for avionic system development to comply with industry standard, 
DO-178C specification.  It is an extension of previous work done by Clachar and Jackson that 
concentrated on formalizing, and verifying and validating UML software models for safety critical 
systems [1] [2].   
One of the principal concerns with amalgamating unmanned aircraft into national air space 
is their lack of ability to robustly sense and avoid other aircraft.  Systems such as these must adhere 
to industry standard, for instance RTCA-DO178B, because they are classified as been safety 
critical.  To ensure that catastrophic events (for example, loss of life) do not occur, accuracy in 
safety critical systems is necessary.  
Unified Modeling Language is the ISO standard for modeling systems. The class diagram 
is one type of UML model used to express systems requirements of stakeholders and to discover 
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additional systems requirements.  However, UML lacks precision when expressing design 
decisions.  Textual descriptions are used to express characteristics of the system, which cannot be 
captured by UML.  This further introduces another level of ambiguity in the models – since they 
are usually expressed in natural language.  Hence, the need for a meta- model (EBNF) that would 
bring more formatting and understanding to the work conducted in this research.  One method that 
is used to remove ambiguity in models is to transform UML models into an analyzable 
representation using formal specification techniques (FSTs).  FSTs are based on mathematical 
logics, which makes use of first order logics and set notation.  Adopting such approach to system 
development plays an important role in safety critical system.  
FSTs have been in existence prior to the beginning of UML.  However, unlike UML it does 
not have a high level of simplicity that makes its models easily communicated to stakeholders.  
Currently, the formalization process is conducted manually.  To make research on FSTs more 
worthy, some degree of automation is imperative.  Therefore, conducting a case study in the area 
of automated tools for FSTs in safety critical systems will be beneficial in enlightening researchers 
on the complexity, advantages, and possible use of such software. 
This case study supports research that identify the benefits of the application of formal 
methods to industries such as formal specification of an oscilloscope (Tektronix) and formal 
methods in safety-critical railway systems.  In the former study, the researcher adopted formal 
methods to gain insight into system architecture. In the latter work, the B formal method was used 
in the development of platform screen door controllers.  Both investigations concluded that the 
application of formal specification appears to be precise, efficient, and well suited to address 
projects requiring high level of safety [59] [60]. 
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Besides applying this methodology to UASs, the contribution of this research may be 
extended to automotive control systems (for example, factory, marine, space exploration, robotics, 
and other specialist areas) where formalism is a necessity.   The use of formal methods is an 
effective mean to improve complex systems reliability and quality.  Benzadri et. al. adopted a 
formal method that utilized modeling interactions between cloud services and customers.  The 
researchers combined Cloud customers’ bigraph and Cloud services bigraph to formally specify 
Cloud services structure.  This study is applicable to formalizing Cloud computing concepts and to 
overcome one of cloud computing main obstacles, specifically bugs in large scale Distributed 
Systems – “one of the difficult issues in cloud computing is removing errors in these very large 
scale distributes systems” [57] [58].  The main issue that still needs to be addressed is the crucial 
absence of an appropriate model for cloud computing.  This research may possibly be able to 
support major Cloud computing concepts specification and allow formal modeling of high-level 
services provided over Cloud computing architecture. 
5.1 Future Work 
The methodology was successfully applied to the operation of the UAS system.  Other 
efforts can apply the same methodology to other systems to prove the validity or accuracy of the 
methodology.  In addition, since the focus of this work was on refining transformation rules from 
an informally defined design in UML to one that is verifiable, formal specification; subsequent 
efforts can derive a process for expressing constraints.  An attempt that can be made is to develop 
a command-line toolkit to automate the steps outlined in the methodology for both the EBNF and 
the transformation rules.  Such tool would accept an operation and ensure the format abide by the 
EBNF configuration.  Subsequently, the tool would apply the refinement steps to each operation by 
decomposing operation into small pieces (Schemas).  The automated toolkit can then be added on 
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as an additional feature of Z/EVES to demonstrate the consistency of refinement and to identify 
errors. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Z Schemas 
 
 
[DOUBLE] 
[GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA] 
[BOOLEAN] 
[UPDATE_DISPLAY] 
[VOID] 
[MOVE] 
[RESOLVE_LAT_LON] 
[UPDATE] 
[GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA_SET] 
[USE_AIRCRAFT] 
[SHOW_ALTITUDE_COLORS] 
[SHOW_ALTITUDE_ICON] 
[SHOW_ALTITUDE_TEXT] 
[SHOW_OVERLAY] 
[SHOW_RADARS] 
[SHOW_OBSTRUCTION] 
[SHOW_AIRPORTS] 
[SHOW_HAZARDS] 
[SHOW_ROAD_MAP] 
[SHOW_MOA_AREAS] 
[SHOW_UAV_AREAS] 
[SHOW_VELOCITY_VECTORS] 
[SHOW_RISK_REGIONS] 
[MOVE] 
[SET_CLEAR_COLOR] 
[SET_CENTER] 
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[SET_SCALE] 
 speed_paramater_01  
speed: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ s: speed ⦁ 0.0 ≤ s ≤250 knots 
 
 Convert_to_internal_speed_Paramater_01  
speed_parameter_01 
 
 Convert_to_internal_speed_Operation_01  
Ξ Radar_Display 
Ξ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Δ Aircraft 
Convert_to_internal_Speed_Parameter_01 
speed ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
speed ′ = speed 
 
 speed_parameter_02  
speed: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ s: speed ⦁ 0.0 ≤ s ≤ 250 knots 
 
 Convert_to_external_speed_Parameter_02  
speed_paramater_02 
 
 Convert_to_externa_speed_Operation_02  
Ξ Radar_Display 
ΞAircraft_Coordinates 
ΔAircraft 
Convert_to_external_Speed_parameter_02 
speed′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
speed′ = speed 
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 heading_parameter_03  
heading: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ h : heading ⦁ 0 ≤ h ≤ 180 
 
 Convert_heading_Parameter_03  
heading_parameter_03 
 
 Convert_heading_Operation_03  
Ξ Radar_Display 
Ξ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Δ Aircraft 
Convert_heading_Parameter_03 
heading ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
heading′ = heading 
 
 
 Calculate_latitude_Operation_04  
Ξ Aircraft 
 
 
 
 
 Latitude_parameter_04  
Latitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lat: latitude ⦁ -90.0 ≤ lat ≤ 90.0 
 
 Longitude_parameter_05  
Longitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lon: longitude ⦁ -180.0 ≤ lon ≤ 180.0 
 
 
 Set_center_Parameter_04  
Latitude_parameter_04 
Longitude_paramater_05 
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 Set_center_Operation_05  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Set_Center_Parameter_04 
Latitude ′: ℙDOUBLE 
Longitude ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
Latitude ′= latitude 
Longitude′ =  longitude 
 
 
 Scale_parameter_06  
Scale: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ s: scale ⦁ 1 inches = 1 foot 
 
 Set_scale_parameter_05  
Scale_paramater_06 
 
 Set_Scale_Operation_06  
Ξ Aircraft 
ΔAircraft_Coordinates 
Set_scale_parameter_05 
Scale ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
Scale ′ = scale 
 
 x_parameter_07  
x: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 
 y: parameter_08  
y: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 move_paramater_06  
x_parameter_07 
y_parameter_08 
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 move_Operation_07  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Move_parameter_06 
X ′: ℙDOUBLE 
Y ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
X ′ = x 
Y ′ = y 
 
 
 Latitude_parameter_09  
Latitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lat: latitude ⦁ -90.0 ≤ lat ≤ 90.0 
 
 Longitude_parameter_10  
Longitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lon: longitude ⦁ -180.0 ≤ lon ≤ 180.0 
 
 x_parameter_11  
x : ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 
 y_parameter_12  
y: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 
 resolve_points_Parameter_07  
latitude_parameter_09 
longtitude_parameter_10 
x_parameter_11 
y_parameter_12 
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 resolve_points_Operation_08  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Resolve_points_Parameter_07 
Latitude ′: ℙDOUBLE 
Longitude ′: ℙDOUBLE 
X ′ : ℙDOUBLE 
Y ′ : ℙDOUBLE 
 
Latitude ′= latitude 
Longitude′ = longitude 
X ′ = x  
Y ′ = y 
 
 x_paramater_13  
x: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 
 y_parameter_14  
y: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 
 latitude_parameter_15  
latitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lat: latitude ⦁ -90.0 ≤ lat ≤ 90.0 
 
 Longitude_parameter_16  
Longitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lon: longitude ⦁ -180.0≤ lon ≤ 180.0 
 
 Resolve_lat_lon_Parameter_08  
x_parameter_13 
y_parameter_14 
latitude_parameter_15 
longitude_parameter_16 
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 resolve_lat_lon_Operation_09  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Aircraft_Coordinates 
Resolve_lat_lon_Parameter_08 
X ′ : ℙDOUBLE 
Y′ : ℙDOUBLE 
Latitude ′: ℙDOUBLE 
Longitude ′: ℙDOUBLE 
 
X ′ = x  
Y ′ = y 
Latitude ′= latitude 
Longitude′ =: longitude 
 
 Update_display_Operation_10  
Ξ Aircraft 
 
 
 
 Data_set_parameter_17  
Data_set: GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA_SET 
 
 
 
 Update_Parameter_09  
Data_set_parameter_17 
 
 Update_Operation_11  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
Update_Parameter_09 
DATA_SET ′ : ℙDOUBLE 
 
DATA_SET ′ = data_Set 
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 Data_set_parameter_18  
Data_set: GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA_SET 
 
 
 
 
 Track_is_parameter_19  
Track_is: ℙℤ 
 
 
 
 
 Update_Parameter_10  
Data_set_parameter_18 
Track_is_parameter_19 
 
 
 
 Update_Operation_12  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
Update_Parameter_10 
Data_set ′ : GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA_SET 
Track_is ′:ℙℤ 
 
Data_set ′= data_set 
Track_is ′= track_is 
 
 
 Aircraft_data_parameter_20  
Aircraft_data: GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA 
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 x_parameter_21  
x: ℙℤ 
 
∀ X: x ⦁ 0.00 ≤ X ≤ 180.00  
 
 y_paramater_22  
y: ℙℤ 
 
∀ Y: y ⦁ 0.00 ≤ Y ≤ 180.00  
 
 passive_mouse_Paramater_11  
air_craft_parameter_20 
x_parameter_21 
y_parameter_22 
 
 passive_mouse_Operation_13  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
passive_mouse_Parameter_11 
Aircraft_data′: GPARS_AIRCRAFT_DATA 
x′: ℙℤ 
y′: ℙℤ 
 
Aircraft_data′ = Aircraft_data 
x′ = x 
y′ = y 
 
 enable_parameter_23  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 use_aircraft_Paramater_12  
enable_parameter_23 
 
 use_aircraft_Operation_14  
Ξ Aircraft 
Use_aircraft_parameter_12 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
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 enable_parameter_24  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 
 show_altitude_colors_Paramater_13  
enable_parameter_24 
 
 show_altitude_colors_Operation_15  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_altitude_colors_parameter_13 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 
 enable_parameter_25  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_altitude_icon_Paramater_14  
enable_parameter_25 
 
 show_altitude_icon_Operation_16  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_altitude_icon_parameter_14 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 
57 
 
 enable_parameter_26  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_altitude_text_Paramater_15  
enable_parameter_26 
 
 
 show_altitude_text_Operation_17  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_altitude_text_parameter_15 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 
 enable_parameter_27  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_overlay_Paramater_16  
enable_parameter 
 
 show_overlay_Operation_18  
Ξ Aircraft 
show_overlay_parameter_16 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
  
 
 enable_parameter_28  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
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 show_radars_Paramater_17  
enable_parameter_28 
 
 show_radars_Operation_19  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_radars_parameter_17 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 enable_parameter_29  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_obstruction_Paramater_18  
enable_parameter_29 
 
 show_obstruction_Operation_20  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_obstruction_parameter_18 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 enable_parameter_30  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_airports_Paramater_19  
enable_parameter_30 
 
 show_airports_Operation_21  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_airports_parameter_19 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
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 enable_parameter_31  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_hazards_Paramater_20  
enable_parameter_31 
 
 show_hazards_Operation_22  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_hazards_parameter_20 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 enable_parameter_32  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_road_map_Paramater_21  
enable_parameter_32 
 
 show_road_map_Operation_23  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_road_map_parameter_21 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 enable_parameter_33  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_moa_areas_Paramater_22  
enable_parameter_33 
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 show_moa_areas_Operation_24  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_moa_areas_parameter_22 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 
 enable_parameter_34  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_uav_areas_Paramater_23  
enable_parameter_34 
 
 show_uav_areas_Operation_25  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_uav_areas_parameter_23 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 enable_parameter_35  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_ velocity_vector_Paramater_24  
enable_parameter_35 
 
 show_ velocity_vector_Operation_26  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_velocity_vector_parameter_24 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
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 enable_parameter_36  
enable: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
 
 
 show_risk_regions_Paramater_25  
enable_parameter_36 
 
 show_risk_regions_Operation_27  
Ξ Aircraft 
Show_risk_regiond_parameter_25 
enable ′: ℙBOOLEAN 
 
enable ′ = enable 
 
 x_parameter_37  
x: ℙℤ 
 
 
 
 y_parameter_38  
y: ℙℤ 
 
 
 
 move_Paramater_26  
x_parameter_37 
y_parameter_38 
 
 move_Operation_28  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
move_parameter_26 
x ′: ℙℤ 
y ′: ℙℤ 
 
x ′ = x 
y ′ = y 
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 red_parameter_39  
red: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 green_parameter_40  
green: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 blue_parameter_41  
blue: ℙDOUBLE 
 
 
 set_clear_color_parameter_27  
red_parameter_39 
green_parameter_40 
blue_parameter_41 
 
 set_clear_color_Operation_29  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
Set_clear_color_parameter_27 
Red ′ = ℙDOUBLE 
Green ′ = ℙDOUBLE 
Blue ′ = ℙDOUBLE 
 
Red ′ = red 
Green ′ = green 
Blue ′ = blue 
 
 Latitude_parameter_42  
Latitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lat: latitude ⦁ -90.0 ≤≥ lat ≤ 90.0 
 
 Longitude_parameter_43  
Longitude: ℙDOUBLE 
 
∀ lon: longitude ⦁ -180.0 ≤ lon ≤ 180.0 
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 Set_center_parameter_28  
Latitude_parameter_42 
Longitude_parameter_43 
 
 Set_center_Operation_30  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
Set_center_parameter_28 
Latitude ′ = ℙDOUBLE 
Longitude ′ = ℙDOUBLE 
 
Latitude ′ = latitude 
Longtitude ′ = longitude 
 
 New_scale_parameter_44  
New_scale: ℙℤ 
 
 
 Set_scale_parameter_29  
New_scale_paramater_44 
 
 Set_scale_operation_31  
Ξ Aircraft 
Δ Radar_Display 
Set_scale_parameter_29 
New_Scale ′ : ℙℤ 
 
New_scale ′ = new_scale 
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